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Abstract:  
We develop and estimate a DSGE model which realistically assumes that many 
goods in the economy are produced through more than one stage of production. 
Firms produce differentiated goods at an intermediate stage and a final stage, post 
different prices at both stages, and face stage-specific technological change. Wage-
setting households are imperfectly competitive with respect to labor skills. 
Intermediate-stage technology shocks explain most of short-run output fluctuations, 
whereas final-stage technology shocks only have a small impact. Despite the 
dominance of technology shocks, the model predicts a near-zero correlation between 
hours worked and the return to work and mildly procyclical real wages. The factors 
mainly responsible for these findings are an input-output linkage between firms 
operating at the different stages and movements in the relative price of goods. We 
show that, depending the source, a technology improvement may either have a 
contractionary  or expansionary impact on employment. 
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1 Introduction
The empirical identification of the underlying forces that cause business cycles is a leading topic of
research in macroeconomics. In a series of influential articles based on neoclassical theory, shocks
to total factor productivity (TFP) are considered to be the major source of short-run aggregate
fluctuations (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hansen, 1985; Prescott, 1986). However, a recent
literature claims that technology shocks are mostly irrelevant for postwar business cycles (e.g.,
Gal´ı, 1999; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson, 2004; Basu, Fernald and Kimball, 2006).1 For
instance, Hall (1997) forcefully argues that real business cycle (RBC) models, emphasizing the
importance of technology shocks and intertemporal mechanisms, must be called into question. He
presents suggestive evidence that random shifts in household preferences, rather than exogenous
variations in the pace of technology, are the main factors driving postwar business cycles. While
sharing Hall’s (1997) scepticism about the relevance of standard RBC models for the analysis
of short-run fluctuations, the present paper proposes a new explanation of the transmission of
technological progress and offers new evidence of the importance to technology shocks for the
understanding of business cycles.
Most optimization-based macroeconomic models assume that firms operate at the finished-
good processing stage for which technological change matters only at the final stage of production.
However, several goods in the economy are typically produced through more than one processing
stage, while firms at different stages in the processing chain charge different prices for the goods
they produce. Considering this reality prompts some potentially important questions about the
propagation of technological change. Can exogenous variations in the pace of technology during
intermediate stages of production have an impact on the business cycle? If so, is it quantitatively
important? If technology shocks are found to be an important source of short-run fluctuations in a
model featuring a multi-stage production and pricing structure, can this structure also contribute
to remedy anomalies that have plagued a large class of models wherein technology shocks are the
dominant source of business-cycle fluctuations? Based on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model embedding a two-stage production and pricing structure, and estimated on U.S.
postwar quarterly data, our paper answers affirmatively to all these questions.
For the purpose of our investigation, we construct a DSGE model of the postwar U.S. business
cycle that incorporates the following main structural components: i) price-setting monopolistic
competitors that produce differentiated goods both at an intermediate stage and a final stage, ii)
1However, Fisher (2006) provides evidence suggesting that investment-specific rather than neutral technology
shocks matter for the business cycle.
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exogenous variations in the pace of technology which are specific to each processing stage, iii) an
interconnection between firms modeled by the use of intermediate goods as productive inputs by
firms engaged in the production of finished goods, iv) allocative movements in the relative price
of goods, v) wage-setting monopolistic households with differentiated labor skills, vi) some real
frictions in the form of costs incurred by increasing the stock of aggregate physical capital and by
varying the quantity of the labor input at each processing stage, vii) a monetary authority that sets
short-term interest rates according to a Taylor-type rule, and viii) structural shocks to preferences,
technology at different stages, and monetary policy. The model is estimated over the postwar U.S.
period with econometric techniques similar to those in Ireland (2004a,b).
The evidence in Basu (1995) and Huang, Liu and Phaneuf (2004) establishes that the interaction
between nominal rigidities and a roundabout input-output structure may significantly alter the
transmission of monetary shocks.2 However, while these models assume that firms are related
through a horizontal roundabout input-output structure within a single final stage of production,
our model postulates that firms are linked vertically, across processing stages. Hence, our framework
is closer in spirit to a class of models featuring production chains such as Blanchard (1983) and
Huang and Liu (2001, 2005).3 Furthermore, given the recent controversy on the relevance of
technology shocks for short-run fluctuations, our paper takes a closer look at the effects of stage-
specific technological change on the postwar business cycle rather than focusing on the effects of
monetary shocks only.
A first set of substantive findings can be summarized as follows. The two-stage production and
pricing model is strongly supported by the data. Some key structural parameters of the model,
including the share of intermediate goods into the production of finished goods as well as the
parameters determining the length of nominal contracts and the importance of the real frictions
are estimated to be statistically significant and economically meaningful. According to the variance
decompositions for a variety of forecast horizons obtained from our estimated two-stage model, the
2Basu (1995) shows that a demand-driven model with intermediate inputs and sticky prices accounts for procyclical
productivity, while predicting large welfare losses from monetary nonneutrality. Huang et al. (2004) show that such
a model with intermediate inputs, nominal wage rigidity and nominal price rigidity is able to capture the switch in
the cyclicality of real wages observed from the interwar to the postwar period even when aggregate fluctuations are
driven only by monetary shocks.
3Blanchard (1983) studies the impact of a production chain structure on price level inertia, goods early in the
chain having more flexible prices than goods further down the chain. Huang and Liu (2001) propose a DGE model
that stresses the role of production chains in the transmission of monetary shocks. Using a calibrated model, Huang
and Liu (2005) assume an input-output linkage between sectors to analyze the design of optimal monetary policy
with several sources of nominal price rigidities.
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intermediate-stage technology shock accounts for the bulk of postwar fluctuations, contributing to
52 and 70 percent of the four and twenty quarter ahead cyclical variance of output, respectively.
Furthermore, we find that the intermediate-stage technology shock is the main source of cyclical
movements in intermediate-stage and final-stage hours. Meanwhile, the final-stage technology shock
explains only a small fraction of the cyclical variance in output–less than 10 percent over an horizon
of four to twenty quarters, a finding which is broadly consistent with the evidence reported by other
researchers with somewhat different approaches (e.g., Gal´ı, 1999; Christiano et al., 2004; Basu et
al., 2006). The preference shock plays a minor role over all horizons. The policy shock has a
substantial impact on the variance of output over a very short horizon, explaining 51 and 36
percent, respectively, of the one and four quarter ahead variability in output, but its effect rapidly
declines as the horizon increases. However, it feeds more than 70 percent of the variance in finished-
good inflation over all horizons, while technology shocks of all stages explain between 20 and 25
percent of the variability in finished-good inflation once their effects are combined.
We propose an explanation as to why the intermediate-stage technology shock has such a
strong impact on short-run fluctuations while its final-stage counterpart does not. Consider first a
technological improvement at the intermediate stage of production. Our estimated model predicts
that this type of shock will give rise to a persistent drop in intermediate-good inflation and to
a sharp, persistent decline in the relative price of intermediate goods. The fall in the relative
price of intermediate goods has principally two effects. First, it exerts a forceful upward pressure
on the demand for intermediate goods, leading to a strong increase in the demand for labor and
capital inputs at the intermediate stage and to higher income for the household. With higher
income, consumption, investment, and the households’ demand for the final good rise. Second,
as intermediate goods become relatively less expensive, firms use more intermediate inputs in the
production of finished goods, which further raises final output. Overall, a positive intermediate-
stage technology shock drives output and employment up along the production chain, generating
a boom in output and hours at all stages.
The mechanisms are very different when technology improves at the final stage. Both finished-
good inflation and the relative price of finished goods fall. However, for this case, our estimated
model reveals that the decline in the relative price of finished goods is both smaller and less
persistent than the fall in the relative price of intermediate goods that follows an intermediate-
stage technology improvement, except for the period immediately after the shock. Hence, the
upward pressure on the demand for finished goods is not appreciable. Furthermore, the rise in the
relative price of intermediate goods lowers the demand for this type of good. Both intermediate-
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stage output and hours fall. Final-stage firms use less intermediate goods to produce their output.
Overall, the increase in the demand for final output is not strong enough to keep up with the rise
in final-stage productivity, so that final-stage hours will fall.
Working with a one-stage model, Gal´ı (1999) shows that an exogenous increase in multifactor
productivity may lead to a short-run fall in employment as long as nominal prices are sticky and
monetary policy is weakly accommodative (see also Basu, Fernald and Kimball, 2006). In contrast
with the standard sticky-price model, our two-stage model has startlingly different implications
for the adjustment of hours depending on the source of technological change. First, it predicts a
strong and positive comovement between hours and output which is typical of postwar business
cycles in response to an intermediate-stage technology improvement. Second, it also implies a
short-run decline in hours worked in response to a final-stage technology improvement. However,
as our paper shows, the short-run decline in hours following a positive final-stage technology shock
is mostly driven by movements in the relative price of goods and by the interconnectedness of firms
at various stages, not by sticky prices and a weakly accommodative monetary policy. Still, our
paper shows that the new keynesian features of the model play a key role in our main findings.
A second set of substantive results concerns our model’s ability to overcome some well known
anomalies encountered in a wide range of business cycle models characterized by technology shocks
as the dominant source of fluctuations. For example, the estimated two-stage model dramatically
improves on the performance of canonical, one-stage real business cycle models. Kydland and
Prescott (1982), for instance, argue that a successful model should explain ”why...the consumption
of market produced goods and the consumption of leisure move in opposite directions in the absence
of any apparent large movement in the real wage” (p.1360), while ”cyclical employment fluctuates
substantially more than productivity does” (p.1367). The two-stage model does very well along
these particular dimensions of the data, predicting ratios of the volatility of the average productivity
of labor to output, hours to productivity and real wages to output that are close to those found in
the data.
Furthermore, despite the dominance of technology shocks as a source of short-run fluctua-
tions, the two-stage model successfully passes Christiano and Eichenbaum’s (1992) ”litmus test for
macroeconomic models” (p.430), predicting a near-zero correlation between hours worked and the
average productivity of labor.4 Hansen and Wright (1992) have shown that a large class of RBC
4This is also known in the literature as the Dunlop-Tarshis observation. Stated literally, the Dunlop-Tarshis
observation is the fact that real wages have been more or less acyclical during the interwar period rather than
strongly countercyclical. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) interpret the near-zero correlation between hours and
productivity as the modern reincarnation of the Dunlop-Tarshis observation.
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models fails to explain this critical comovement, predicting a correlation between hours and pro-
ductivity which is high and positive. Also, the two-stage model correctly predicts that real wages
are mildly procyclical, while they usually are strongly procyclical in RBC models.
To improve the correlation between hours and productivity, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)
suggest adding measurable economic impulses that possibly shift the labor supply function to an
otherwise standard RBC model with indivisible labor. They incorporate shocks to government
consumption and find that the correlation between hours and the return to work can be reduced
to 0.575. Pushing this line of research further, Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) include distur-
bances in labor and capital tax rates, in addition to government consumption shocks.5 Contrasting
sharply with these models, the two-stage model does not have to rely on variables that may po-
tentially shift the labor supply function to correctly predict labor market dynamics. With hours
rising when technology improves at the intermediate stage, the correlation between hours and pro-
ductivity conditional on this shock is positive. Because hours fall following a positive final-stage
technology shock, the correlation between hours and productivity produced by this shock is neg-
ative. Thus, on balance, the two-stage model predicts a near-zero correlation between hours and
the return to work even when it is conditional only on technology shocks.
The two-stage model also has interesting implications for price dynamics. One finds in the early
work of Means (1935) the observation that the nominal prices of goods early in the production chain
are significantly more volatile than the prices of goods further down the chain of production (see
also the evidence in Gordon, 1981, Blanchard, 1987, Clark, 1999 and Hanes, 1999). Such evidence
also motivates the work of Blanchard (1983).6 The two-stage model predicts that the variability in
intermediate-stage inflation is nearly two times larger than variability in final-stage inflation, which
seems broadly consistent with the evidence we report later in the paper.
To shed some light on our model’s main driving mechanism, we estimate two variants of our
general framework. The first assumes that firms produce only finished goods and still features
sticky nominal wages and real frictions, but only one source of nominal price rigidity. The second
incorporates the two-stage production structure and real frictions, but with fully flexible nominal
wages and prices. This variant can be interpreted as a two-stage RBC model. On the basis of formal
likelihood ratio tests, we provide evidence that the general framework cannot be rejected in favor
of each of the variants. The one-stage model with nominal rigidities predicts highly countercyclical
5Adding some real frictions like habit formation in consumption and investment adjustment costs to a RBC model
can possibly reverse the sign of the correlation between hours and productivity, making it strongly negative as hours
may decline following a positive technology shock (e.g., Francis and Ramey, 2005).
6See also Huang and Liu (2001).
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real wages and a strong, negative correlation between hours and productivity. The two-stage RBC
model, like standard one-stage RBC models, predicts highly procyclical real wages and a strong,
positive correlation between hours and productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-stage model with nominal rigidi-
ties and real frictions. Section 3 discusses some estimation issues. Section 4 presents and analyzes
our main findings. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 A Model with a Two-Stage Production and Pricing Structure
The economy is inhabited by a large number of infinitely lived households endowed with differen-
tiated labor skills. Each household has preferences defined over expected streams of consumption
goods, real balances and leisure. Utility is additively separable in leisure. Preferences are subject to
a shock that shifts the marginal utility of goods and real balances consumption. A competitive firm
aggregates households’ labor into a composite labor input employed by two sets of producers. At the
intermediate stage, intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of price-setting monopolistic
competitors using capital and labor. These goods are CES-aggregated by a perfectly competitive
firm to yield a composite intermediate input. At the final stage, the composite intermediate input
is used, alongside capital and labor, by a continuum of price-setting monopolistic competitors to
produce finished goods. These goods are CES-aggregated by a perfectly competitive firm to yield
a final good. The timing of all price setting and wage setting decisions is exogenous in the spirit
of Calvo (1983). Households must pay a cost to adjust the aggregate stock of physical capital. It
is also costly to vary hours worked at each stage. In each period, capital is perfectly mobile across
firms and is rented by finished-good and intermediate-good producers after observing all shocks.
Technology shocks affect the productivity of producers at each stage. The monetary authority sets
the nominal interest rate based on a Taylor-type rule, which also subject to stochastic innovations.
2.1 Households
Assume a continuum of households, each endowed with a differentiated skill indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
The household i ∈ [0, 1] has a utility function:
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
γ
γ − 1κt log
(
Ct(i)
γ−1
γ + b
1
γ
(
Mt(i)
Py,t
) γ−1
γ
)
− µNt(i)
1+η
1 + η
]
, (1)
where E is an expectations operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount factor, Ct(i) is real con-
sumption, Mt(i)/Py,t is real money balances, Py,t is the price index for finished goods, and Nt(i)
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denotes hours worked; γ, b, µ and η are positive structural parameters, with γ representing the
constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, and η the inverse of the
elasticity of labor supply. The representative household’s total time available is normalized to one
in each period.
The preference shock, κt, has the following time-series representation:
log(κt) = ρκ log(κt−1) + εκ,t, (2)
where εκ,t is a serially uncorrelated independent and identically distributed process with mean-zero,
and standard error σκ (see also Hall, 1997, Gal´ı and Rabanal, 2004 and Ireland, 2004a).
Household i ∈ [0, 1] faces the budget constraint
Ct(i) + It(i) + CACt(i) +
Mt(i)
Py,t
+
Bt+1(i)
Py,t
=
Wt(i)
Py,t
Nt(i) +
Qt
Py,t
Kt(i) +
Mt−1(i)
Py,t
+Rt−1
Bt(i)
Py,t
+
Dy,t(i)
Py,t
+
Dz,t(i)
Py,t
+
Tt(i)
Py,t
, (3)
where It(i) is investment, CACt(i) represents the cost households have to pay to adjust the ag-
gregate stock of physical capital Kt(i), Bt+1(i) stands for the bonds carried by the household into
period t + 1, Wt(i) is the nominal wage rate, Qt is the nominal rental rate of capital, Rt−1 is the
gross nominal interest rate between period t−1 and period t, Dy,t(i) denotes the nominal dividends
paid to the household by firms operating at the final stage, Dz,t(i) represents the nominal dividends
paid by firms producing at the intermediate stage, and Tt(i) is a lump-sum nominal transfer from
the monetary authority.
The cost CACt(i) is determined by the function:
CACt(i) =
ϕk
2
(
Kt+1(i)
Kt(i)
− 1
)2
Kt(i), (4)
where ϕk > 0.
The investment technology is
It(i) = Kt+1(i)− (1− δ)Kt(i), (5)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation of physical capital.
The aggregate labor input, Nt, is a composite of all labor skills,
Nt =
(∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
, (6)
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution between skills. The demand function for labor skill i is
Nt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−σ
Nt, (7)
where the wage rate Wt of the composite skill is related to the wage rates of the differentiated skills
by
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(i)1−σdi
) 1
1−σ
. (8)
The household i chooses Ct(i), Mt(i), Bt+1(i), Kt+1(i) and Wt(i) (when the household can
adjust the nominal wage) which maximize the expected discounted sum of utility flows, subject to
the budget constraint and the firms’ labor demand for skill i.
2.1.1 Wage Contract
In each period, the nominal wage rate can be adjusted with probability 1 − dw. The first-order
condition with respect to Wt(i) determines the following nominal wage contract
W˜t(i) =
σ
σ − 1
Et
∑∞
q=0(βdw)
qNt+q(i)η+1
Et
∑∞
q=0(βdw)qNt+q(i)λt+q(i)
1
Py,t+q
, (9)
where λt(i) is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. At the
symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate nominal wage is given by the following recursive equation:
Wt =
[
dwW
1−σ
t−1 + (1− dw)W˜ 1−σt
] 1
1−σ
, (10)
where W˜t is the average wage of the households allowed to revise their nominal wages in period t.
2.2 Firms in the Two-Stage Production Structure
Firms at the intermediate and final stages are related by an input-output linkage. Monopolistically
competitive producers set nominal prices at each stage. In any given period, the price of finished
goods can be adjusted with probability 1−dy, and the prices of intermediate goods with probability
1− dz.
2.2.1 Final Stage of Production
Final-stage output Yt is a composite of all the finished goods Yt(j), j ∈ (0, 1) denoting a particular
type of finished good,
9
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
θy−1
θy dj
) θy
θy−1
,
where θy is the elasticity of substitution between finished goods.
The firm producing finished good j solves the following profit maximization problem:
max
Yt(j)
Py,t
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
θy−1
θy dj
) θy
θy−1 −
∫ 1
0
Py,t(j)Yt(j)dj,
where Py,t(j) is the price of good j. The demand function for this type of good is
Yt(j) =
(
Py,t(j)
Py,t
)−θy
Yt, (11)
where the price index for the finished goods Py,t is given by
Py,t =
(∫ 1
0
Py,t(j)1−θydj
) 1
1−θy
.
2.2.2 Intermediate Stage of Production
Intermediate-stage output Zt is a composite of all the intermediate goods Zt(l), l ∈ (0, 1) denoting
a particular type of intermediate good,
Zt =
(∫ 1
0
Zt(l)
θz−1
θz dl
) θz
θz−1
,
where θz is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
The demand function for the intermediate good l is
Zt(l) =
(
Pz,t(l)
Pz,t
)−θz
Zt, (12)
where Pz,t(l) is the price of good l. The price index for the intermediate goods Pz,t is
Pz,t =
(∫ 1
0
Pz,t(l)1−θzdl
) 1
1−θz
.
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2.2.3 Firms at the Final Stage
Producing finished good j requires the use of labor Ny,t(j), capital Ky,t(j), and intermediate goods
Zt(j). Finished-good j is produced through the following constant returns to scale technology:
Yt(j) = Zt(j)φ
[
Ay,tKy,t(j)αyNy,t(j)1−αy
]1−φ
, (13)
where φ, αy ∈ (0, 1).
The final-stage technology shock Ay,t follows the stochastic process
log(Ay,t) = (1− ρAy) log(Ay) + ρAy log(Ay,t−1) + εy,t, (14)
where εy,t is a serially uncorrelated independent and identically distributed process with mean-zero,
and standard error σy
Each firm j must pay a cost to vary hours worked. This cost is determined by the following
function:
LACy,t(j) =
ϕy
2
(
Ny,t(j)
Ny,t−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt,
where ϕy > 0.
Firms at the final stage are price-takers in the markets for inputs. The firm producing finished
good j solves the following problem :
max
{Ky,t(j),Ny,t(j),Zt(j),Py,t(j)}
Et
∞∑
q=0
(βdy)q
λt+q
λt
Dy,t+q(j)
Py,t+q
,
subject to:
Dy,t(j) = Py,t(j)Yt(j)−QtKy,t(j)−WtNy,t(j)− Pz,tZt(j)− Py,tLACy,t(j),
and equations (11) and (13).
2.2.4 Price Decisions at the Final Stage
The first-order condition for Py,t(j) determines the contract for the price of finished good j
P˜y,t(j) =
θy
θy − 1
Et
∑∞
q=0(βdy)
q λt+q
λt
ζy,t(j)Yt+q(j)
Et
∑∞
q=0(βdy)q
λt+q
λt
Yt+q(j) 1Py,t+q
, (15)
where ζy,t(j) is the real marginal cost of the firm producing finished good j.
At the symmetric equilibrium, the average price of finished goods is
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Py,t =
[
dyP
1−θy
y,t−1 + (1− dy)P˜ 1−θyy,t
] 1
1−θy , (16)
where P˜y,t is the average price of firms at the final stage allowed to revise their prices in period t.
2.2.5 Firms at the Intermediate Stage
The intermediate-stage firm l rents capital Kz,t(l) and hires workers Nz,t(l) to produce the inter-
mediate good Zt(l) with the following production technology:
Zt(l) = Az,tKz,t(l)αzNz,t(l)1−αz , (17)
where αz ∈ (0, 1).
The intermediate-stage technology shock Az,t is generated by the following stochastic process
log(Az,t) = (1− ρAz) log(Az) + ρAz log(Az,t−1) + εz,t, (18)
where εz,t is a mean–zero, i.i.d. normal process with standard error σAz .
Intermediate-stage firm l must pay a cost to vary hours worked. This cost is determined by the
following function:
LACz,t(l) =
ϕz
2
(
Nz,t(l)
Nz,t−1(l)
− 1
)2
Zt,
where ϕz > 0.
Firm l solves the profit maximization problem
max
{Kz,t(l),Nz,t(l),Pz,t(l)}
Et
∞∑
q=0
(βdz)q
λt+q
λt
Dz,t+q(l)
Py,t+q
,
subject to:
Dz,t(l) = Pz,t(l)Zt(l)−QtKz,t(l)−WtNz,t(l)− Pz,tLACz,t(l),
and equations (12) and (17).
2.2.6 Price Decisions at the Intermediate Stage
The first-order condition for Pz,t(l) determines the contract for the price of intermediate good l
P˜z,t(l) =
θz
θz − 1
Et
∑∞
q=0(βdz)
q λt+q
λt
ζz,t(l)Zt+q(l)
Et
∑∞
q=0(βdz)q
λt+q
λt
Zt+q(l) 1Pz,t+l
, (19)
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where ζz,t(l) is the real marginal cost of the firm producing intermediate good l. At the symmetric
equilibrium, the average price of the intermediate goods is given by
Pz,t =
[
dzP
1−θz
z,t−1 + (1− dz)P˜ 1−θzz,t
] 1
1−θz , (20)
where P˜z,t is the average price of firms at the intermediate stage allowed to revise their prices in
period t.
2.3 The Monetary Policy Rule
The central bank sets the nominal interest rateRt in response to deviations of finished-good inflation
piy,t and final-stage output Yt from their respective steady-state values pi∗y and Y ∗. Furthermore,
following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), the monetary
authority can smooth nominal interest rates. The rule also includes a serially correlated policy
shock. Some authors have questioned whether the lagged interest rate is a fundamental component
of the policy rule. They argue that it may simply reflect serially correlated policy errors or the
Fed’s reaction to factors not included in the rule (see for example Rudebusch, 2002, and English,
Nelson and Sack, 2003). Hence, our specification is:
log
(
Rt
R∗
)
= ρR log
(
Rt−1
R∗
)
+ (1− ρR)
[
ρpi log
(
piy,t
pi∗y
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y ∗
)]
+ vt, (21)
where
vt = ρvvt−1 + εv,t, (22)
R∗ is the steady-state gross nominal rate of interest, and εv,t is a serially uncorrelated independent
and identically distributed process with mean-zero, and standard error σv.
2.4 Closing the Model
The market-clearing conditions at the symmetric equilibrium are:
Kt = Ky,t +Kz,t, (23)
where Ky,t =
∫
Ky,t(j)dj and Kz,t =
∫
Kz,t(l)dl,
Nt = Ny,t +Nz,t, (24)
where Ny,t =
∫
Ny,t(j)dj and Nz,t =
∫
Nz,t(l)dl,
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Yt = Ct + It + CACt + LACy,t + LACz,t, (25)
and
Mt −Mt−1 = Tt. (26)
The bond market clearing condition implies that
Bt = 0 for all t. (27)
2.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of allocations Ct(i), Bt(i),Mt(i), It(i), Kt+1(i), and the nominal wageWt(i)
for the household i ∈ [0, 1]; allocations Yt(j), Ky,t(j), Ny,t(j), and the price Py,t(j) for the finished-
good producer j ∈ [0, 1]; allocations Zt(l), Kz,t(l), Nz,t(l), and the price Pz,t(l) for the intermediate-
good producer l ∈ [0, 1]; together with prices Py,t, Pz,t, Rt, and the nominal wage Wt that satisfy
the following conditions: (i) the household’s allocations solve its utility maximization problem; (ii)
each finished-good producer’s allocations and price solve its profit maximization problem taking the
other prices and nominal wages as given; (iii) each intermediate-good producer’s allocations and
price solve its profit maximization problem; (iv) the markets for bonds, money, and the composite
goods clear; and (v) the monetary policy is described by the rule (21).
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we assume the existence of state contingent securities
ensuring that, in equilibrium, households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset
holdings, whereas they are heterogeneous with respect to the wage rate and labor supply.
3 Econometric Procedure
3.1 Estimation
The model is solved by log-linearizing its equilibrium conditions around a symmetric steady state
in which all variables are constant. The linearized system yields the following state space represen-
tation:
Xt = AXt−1 +B²t, (28)
Yt = CXt, (29)
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where Xt is a vector that includes the model’s predetermined and exogenous variables and Yt is a
vector composed of the remaining endogenous variables. The likelihood function L(Y T |Θ) associ-
ated with the state-space solution is evaluated using the Kalman filter. Prior to the estimation, we
define the following vector of observables:
Zt =
[
cˆt ŷt R̂t pˆiy,t yˆt − nˆt wˆt
]′
,
which includes real consumption, final output, the nominal interest rate, finished-good inflation,
the average productivity of labor, and the real wages, each variable being measured in percentage-
deviations from its steady-state value.
Since the model is estimated using these six time-series, while it contains four structural shocks,
we append two shocks representing measurement errors (see also Altug, 1989, Sargent, 1989, and
Ireland, 2004b). The system of equations for the selected variables is
Zt = K
(
Xt
Yt
)
+ L
(
²t
et
)
, (30)
where K and L are matrices which are obtained after choosing the appropriate variables in Xt,
Yt, and the vector of errors. The measurement errors, that we assume to be independent from the
structural shocks, follow the autoregressive process:
et+1 =Met + υt, (31)
E
(
υtυ
′
t
)
= Συ, (32)
where M and Συ are diagonal matrices.
3.2 Data
We use U.S. quarterly time series for the period 1960:I to 2004:IV. The nominal interest rate is
measured by the Three-month Treasury Bill Rate. The rate of inflation of finished goods is the
quarterly rate of change of the consumer price index. Real consumption is the sum of consumption
expenditures on nondurable goods and services. Output is the sum of total personal consumption
expenditures and private fixed investment. The real wage is the ratio of the nonfarm business
sector compensation to the consumer price index. Hours worked are the total hours in the nonfarm
business sector. All series, except the nominal interest rate, are seasonally adjusted. Consumption,
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output and hours worked are converted into per capita terms after being divided by the civilian
population aged 16 years and over. Also, all series, except the nominal interest rate and the rate
of inflation, are logged and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
3.3 Calibration
When estimating relatively large structural models using maximum likelihood techniques, it is
sometimes difficult to obtain sensible estimates of all the structural parameters either because
some parameters are not easy to identify or because the optimization algorithm fails to locate the
maximum due the complexity of the objective function. This issue can be alleviated by calibrating
some parameters prior to the estimation. First, the subjective discount factor β is set to 0.995,
which implies a steady-state annual real interest rate of 2 percent. The parameter µ, measuring
the weight on leisure in the utility function, is such that the representative household devotes
approximately one third of its time to work in the steady state. The rate of depreciation of
physical capital is set at 0.025. The parameters θy and θz, determining the steady-state markups of
finished-good and intermediate-good prices over their respective marginal costs, both take a value
of 8, implying a steady-state markup of 14 percent at each stage (see also Basu, 1995 and Huang,
Liu and Phaneuf, 2004).7 The elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor skills σ is 6.0,
and is thus consistent with the microeconomic evidence provided by Griffin (1992) and the evidence
from aggregate time series reported in Ambler, Guay and Phaneuf (2006).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Benchmark Model
The benchmark model is one that includes the complete list of structural ingredients described in
section 2. In that case, the set of structural parameters that we seek to estimate is summarized by{
ρAz , ρAy , ρκ, ρυ, σAz , σAy , σκ, σv, b, γ, η, αz, φ, αy, dz, dy, dw, ϕk, ϕz, ϕy, ρR, ρpi, ρy
}
. Table 1 reports
the point estimates of the structural parameters with their standard deviations.
The shocks to preferences and intermediate-stage technology are the most persistent with AR(1)
coefficients of 0.95 and 0.96, respectively; they are followed by the shock to final-stage technology
with ρAy = 0.87 and by the shock to the policy rule with ρυ = 0.16. Of these four shocks, the
7Basu and Fernald (2002) find that the steady-state markup is about 5 percent when factor utilization rates are
controlled for, while it is about 12 percent without correction for factor utilization. The value proposed by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) is 20 percent without correction for factor utilization.
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policy shock has the largest standard deviation with συ = 0.023, followed by the intermediate-
stage technology shock with σA,z = 0.0197, the final-stage technology shock with σA,y = 0.0181,
and the preference shock with σκ = 0.0133. Hence, it is worth noting that the intermediate-stage
technology shock is more persistent and has a slightly larger standard deviation than its final-stage
counterpart.
The point estimate γ = 0.0701 implies an interest elasticity of money demand of −0.0754, con-
sistent with the evidence reported in Ireland (2003) and Kim (2000). The parameter b determining
the relative importance of consumption and real balances in preferences is 0.0744. The point esti-
mate η = 0.8831 implies an elasticity of labor supply of 1.13, consistent with the evidence reported
in Mulligan (1998).
The probability that the prices of finished goods stay put in any given period is 0.6561, while
for intermediate goods it is 0.6992. These probabilities imply that the prices of finished goods are
reoptimized once every 2.9 quarters on average, while the prices of intermediate goods are revised
once every 3.3 quarters. In comparison, the evidence in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
says that firms change their prices once every 2.5 quarters on average, whereas according to the
evidence in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) they adjust their prices once every 6 quarters.8 The microe-
conomic evidence offered by Bils and Klenow (2004) tells that firms revise their prices somewhat
more frequently than our estimates suggest.9 Wage contracts last 6.5 quarters on average.10
The share of physical capital into the production of intermediate goods αz is 0.3407, while the
share of capital into the production of finished goods αy is 0.13. Both estimates imply a share
of hours which is approximately two thirds at each stage. The point estimate of the share of
intermediate inputs into the production of finished goods φ is 0.2416. This estimate could seem a
little bit low considering that Basu (1995) assigns to the share of intermediate inputs a value of 0.5.
However, it is difficult to draw a direct comparison between our estimate and the calibration in
Basu (1995) for the following reasons. First, Basu (1995) works in the context of a one-stage model
with nominal price rigidity and without capital accumulation. His model is thus very different
from ours. Second, his φ-value is taken from a study by Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987)
that covers the period 1947 to 1979. Furthermore, their study does not rely on a fully articulated
8Their evidence is obtained from one-stage models.
9It is difficult to make a direct comparison between our findings and those of Bils and Klenow (2004), as they
examine the frequency of price changes for 350 categories of goods and services covering about 70 percent of consumer
spending between the years 1995 and 1997.
10Smets and Wouters (2005) report a point estimate of the Calvo-probability for nominal wage contracts of about
0.8 or 0.89 depending on the particular postwar U.S. sample they choose.
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optimization-based model. In contrast, our sample period is much longer (1960:I to 2004:IV) and
our estimate is obtained using a full-blown two-stage DSGE model. Third, the analysis in Jorgenson
et al. (1987) is limited to the U.S. manufacturing sector. The manufacturing industry certainly
uses a greater share of intermediate inputs than many other sectors do. For example, this share is
much smaller in the trade and financial services sectors.
The parameter ϕk determining aggregate capital-adjustment cost is 9.5827. The labor-adjustment-
cost parameter is 5.7406 at the final stage and 3.3746 at the intermediate stage.
The point estimate of ρpi in the policy rule is 1.4702, close to the value of 1.5 proposed by Taylor
(1993). The estimate of ρy is not far from zero. We do not find evidence of strong interest-rate
smoothing with an estimate of ρR of 0.0918.
4.2 Sources of Short-Run Fluctuations
What are the most important shocks for short-run fluctuations? Table 2 reports the variance
decompositions at the infinite horizon for several variables based on our estimated benchmark
model. Over the infinite horizon, the intermediate-stage technology shock is by far the most
important, contributing to 72.3 percent of the variance of final output, 67 percent of the variance
of consumption, 80.7 percent of the variance of investment and 44.9 percent of the variance of
total hours. It also explains 84.2 percent of the variance of intermediate-stage output and 76.2
percent of the variance of intermediate-stage hours. Note that the intermediate-stage technology
shock is also the main source of the variability in final-stage hours, contributing to 37.4 percent
of its variance. In contrast, the final-stage technology shock is not very important, contributing
to 5.1 percent of the variance of final output, 4.8 percent of the variance of consumption, and 5.3
percent of the variance of investment. This shock, however, explains a somewhat larger fraction
of the variability in employment, with 19.6 percent of the variance of total hours worked. The
policy shock is the most important determinant of the variability in inflation, feeding 71.6 percent
of the variance of finished-good inflation and 89.5 percent of the volatility of intermediate-good
inflation. Combining their effects, the two technology shocks explain a non negligible 25 percent
of the variability in finished-good inflation. The preference shock only has a small effect on the
variance of most variables.
Table 3 focuses on the variance decompositions of Yt, Zt, piy,t and piz,t for a broader range of
forecast horizons. The intermediate-stage technology shock is the main force that drives business
cycles, explaining as much as 52.1 percent, 62.3 percent, 65.7 percent and 68 percent, respectively, of
the four-, eight-, twelve-, and twenty-quarter ahead forecast error variance of final output. Mean-
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while, the final-stage technology shock explains only a small percentage–less than 10 percent–of
the variance of final output at the same horizons, a finding which is broadly consistent with the
evidence reported by other researchers using SVAR models (Gal´ı, 1999; Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Vigfusson, 2004). The policy shock contributes quite substantially to output fluctuations at
the one-quarter ahead forecast horizon–50.7 percent–but this percentage rapidly declines as the
horizon increases. The policy shock is also the most important source of variability in inflation at
all horizons. Preference shocks have a negligible effect on the variances of output and inflation.
4.3 The Effects of Stage-Specific Technological Change
We now examine the dynamic effects of stage-specific technological change in the benchmark model.
Figure 1 displays several impulse responses to a one percent intermediate-stage technology shock. A
positive intermediate-stage technology shock is followed by a sharp, persistent decline in the relative
price of intermediate goods pz; the relative price pz initially drops by 0.3 percent, continues to fall
during several quarters before reaching a maximum decline of 1.7 percent after fifteen quarters,
and remains 1 percent below its pre-shock level forty quarters after the shock. With pz falling,
the demand for intermediate goods rises strongly and persistently, inducing a strong, persistent
increase in the demand for labor and capital inputs at the intermediate stage, and leading to higher
income for the households. With a higher income, the households’ demand for final output rises,
further raising the demand for intermediate inputs and primary factors. Firms producing finished
goods also use more intermediate inputs. Thus, an intermediate-stage technology shock generates
a strong increase in final output. Note also that the intermediate-stage technology shock produces
typical hump-shaped responses in final output, consumption, investment and total hours, hence
meeting the criterion of a model evaluation suggested by Cogley and Nason (1995).
The dynamic responses of prices after an intermediate-stage technology shock are different at
the two stages. A positive intermediate-stage technology shock has a direct impact on the real
marginal cost of firms producing intermediate goods, generating a persistent decline in the rate of
inflation of intermediate goods. In contrast, the rate of inflation of finished goods rises by 0.22
percent on impact due to the strong expansion in final-stage output.
The effects of a positive final-stage technology shock are summarized in Figure 2. The relative
price of finished goods falls (or pz rises). However, the effect on pz is both significantly smaller (in
absolute value) and less persistent than the effect generated by an intermediate-stage technology
shock. Therefore, the upward pressure exerted by this type of shock on the demand for finished
goods is not very strong, so final output weakly rises. Also, because of the rise in the relative
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price of intermediate goods, firms producing finished goods use less intermediate goods to produce.
Thus, given the relatively weak pressure on the demand for finished goods and less intermediate
inputs used in the production of finished goods, the rise in the demand for final output cannot
keep up with the increase in final-stage productivity, so final-stage hours have to fall. Furthermore,
because pz rises, the demand for intermediate goods falls, leading to a decline in intermediate-stage
hours and output. A final-stage technology improvement is therefore followed by a decline in hours
worked at both stages.
Overall, an intermediate-stage positive technology shock has a much stronger expansionary
impact than its final-stage counterpart. Also, a key feature of the two-stage model is that a
technology improvement may either have an expansionary or contractionary impact on employment
depending on the source of technological change.
4.4 Business Cycle Statistics
One way to assess the performance of our benchmark model is to look at its ability to match a
fairly comprehensive set of stylized facts. Table 4 compares business-cycle statistics taken from
the data with those predicted by the estimated model. The time series are detrended using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
The estimated benchmark model provides a good match on several dimensions of the data.
In particular, it has interesting implications for the dynamics of the labor market. As mentioned
earlier, an important strand of literature has focused on two stylized facts observed during the
postwar period: i) hours worked have fluctuated a lot more than the average productivity of
labor (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hansen, 1985) and ii) the correlation between hours and
productivity has been close to zero (e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Hansen and Wright,
1992; Braun, 1994; McGrattan, 1994). The model accounts very well for these facts. First, it
predicts that the volatility of hours is 1.86 times larger than that of productivity, while it is 1.76
times larger in the data. Second, the correlation between hours and productivity in the benchmark
model is −0.116, while according to the data it is −0.053.
Models in which technology shocks are assumed to be the dominant source of short-run fluc-
tuations usually predict a strong positive correlation between hours and productivity. To better
understand the reasons of this improvement, we decompose the correlation between hours and
productivity conditional on the type of shock causing it in the benchmark model. The results are
presented in Table 5. When driven only by the intermediate-stage technology shock, the correlation
between hours and productivity is 0.506, while it is −0.83 conditional on the final-stage technology
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shock. Combining the effects of both technology shocks, this correlation becomes −0.02, which is
very close to the unconditional correlation found in the data. This finding follows directly from the
model’s implications concerning the response of hours worked following a technology improvement,
hours rising when technology improves at the intermediate stage and declining when the technol-
ogy improvement takes place at the final stage. Thus, unlike other types of models that have been
proposed in the literature before (e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Braun, 1994; McGrat-
tan, 1994), the two-stage model does not have to rely on disturbances that shift the labor-supply
function to provide a better match of the correlation between hours and productivity.
The benchmark model also does well in reproducing the relative volatility of hours and output,
predicting a ratio of 0.928 compared to 0.854 in the data. At the same time, it does not imply that
real wages are excessively volatile relative to output. We conclude that the two-stage model is able
to take up the challenge of Kydland and Prescott (1982), as hours worked fluctuate significantly
more than productivity without generating excessively large variations in real wages.
Note also that the benchmark model predicts that real wages are mildly procyclical, which
is also in agreement with available evidence. Models in which technology shocks play a major
role usually predict that real wages are strongly procyclical. One reason why the benchmark
model does well along this particular dimension is that it implies a mildly positive correlation
between real wages and output conditional on both technology shocks. The model predicts that
the technology-driven correlation between real wages and output is 0.52, which is not too far from
the unconditional correlation of 0.372 found in the data. The mildly positive correlation between
real wages and output in the face of technology shocks can be explained as follows. First, real
wages are weakly countercyclical following a final-stage technology shock. As seen before, when
technology improves at the final stage, final output rises during 3-4 quarters, and then begins to
fall during several quarters. This observed pattern in the dynamic response of final output mostly
reflects the negative hump-shaped responses of final-stage hours and intermediate goods following
a final-stage technology improvement. Second, real wages are quite procyclical in response to an
intermediate-stage technology shock. So, on balance, real wages are mildly procyclical conditional
on both technology shocks. After taking into account the effects of aggregate demand shocks, the
correlation between real wages and output in the benchmark model is 0.247.
We look next at the behavior of nominal prices in the benchmark model. Following Huang and
Liu (2005), we measure finished-good inflation and intermediate-good inflation by CPI-inflation
and PPI-inflation, respectively. The benchmark model matches very well the relative volatility of
both inflation rates and the comovement between these two rates. The ratio of the volatility of
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CPI-inflation to PPI-inflation found in the data is 0.475, whereas in the benchmark model the ratio
of the variability in finished-good inflation to intermediate-good inflation is 0.554. The comovement
between these rates in the data is 0.75 and 0.805 in the model.
4.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
This section identifies the most important factors behind our main results. We first look at the
role of the input-output linkage by assuming that the parameter φ takes an arbitrarily small value,
while the rest of parameters in the benchmark model remains the same. Figure 3 looks at several
impulse responses following an intermediate-stage shock and a final-stage technology shock, respec-
tively. With a very small share of intermediate inputs, firms producing finished goods are almost
completely insulated from the intermediate stage. A positive intermediate-stage technology shock
generates a sharp decline in the relative price of intermediate goods and a very strong increase in
intermediate-stage hours and output. However, the boom in intermediate-stage output is weakly
transmitted to the final stage, firms producing finished goods making almost no use of intermedi-
ate inputs. Hence, the increase in final output is much smaller without the input-output linkage.
Meanwhile, the effects of final-stage technology shocks on final output, total hours, consumption
and investment are almost unaffected by this change.
Gal´ı (1999), in the context of a one-stage model with sticky nominal prices, argues that nominal
price rigidity and a weakly accommodative monetary policy are two factors that may have a major
impact on the short-run response of employment following a technology improvement. Figure 4
looks at the role of sticky nominal prices in the benchmark model by assuming that the prices of
finished goods and intermediate goods are both reoptimized in each period (dy = dz = 0). Assuming
that nominal prices are perfectly flexible at both stages has a minor impact on the results, as the
relative prices of goods are not very affected by the changes in dy and dz. Hence, although nominal
prices are revised in each period, employment continues to fall following a final-stage technology
improvement, while it still rises when technology improves at the intermediate stage.
One possible concern is that the smaller effects of a final-stage technology shock on final output
may be driven by the smaller persistence found in the stochastic process generating this type of
shock relative to the persistence found in the process for the intermediate-stage technology shock.
Indeed, we saw that the AR(1) coefficient estimated for the final-stage technology shock is 0.87,
while it is 0.96 for the AR(1) coefficient of the intermediate-stage technology shock. Figure 5
conveys two types of information. First, it looks at the responses of final output, consumption,
investment, final-stage hours and total hours following a positive final-technology shock for different
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values of ρAy (0.75 and 0.96). With a higher AR(1) coefficient, the final-stage technology shock
generates a short-run increase in consumption, investment and output, but the effect on final
output is not very strong. The second element of information is perhaps more interesting. Here,
we assign an arbitrarily small value to the share of intermediate inputs into the production of
finished goods, while assuming different values for ρAy . When ρAy = 0.96 and final-stage firms do
not use intermediate inputs to produce, a final-stage technology improvement generates a strong,
positive, hump-shaped response in final output, consumption and investment. A positive final-stage
technology shock now induces a positive, hump-shaped, short-run increase in final-stage and total
hours worked. This finding also confirms the important role played by the input-output linkage in
the benchmark model.
4.5 Alternative Models
Another way to assess our model’s main driving mechanism is to estimate some model’s variants
and compare their results with those of the benchmark model. We label Model I, a model featuring
only one stage of production, thus excluding the two-stage production and pricing structure and
the input-output linkage between stages. This model is estimated after imposing the following
parameter restrictions: {ρA,z = σA,z = αz = φ = dz = ϕz = 0}. It is driven by three structural
shocks only, as the intermediate-stage technology shock is now omitted from the model. Model I
is similar to existing new keynesian models.
Model II, on the other hand, combines the two-stage production structure, while assuming that
firms reoptimize their prices and households revise their nominal wages in each period. Therefore,
Model II is estimated after imposing the following parameter restrictions: {dz = dy = dw = 0}.
This model can be interpreted as a two-stage RBC model. The estimated parameter values of
Model I and Model II are presented in Table 1.
The point estimate of dw in Model I is 0.9250, implying that nominal wages are revised once
every 13.3 quarters on average. The point estimate of dy is 0.7325, meaning that the price of
finished goods is readjusted once every 3.74 quarters on average. The other significant change in
parameter values concerns ρpi, which is much higher in Model I than in the benchmark model (2.13
vs 1.47). The business-cycle statistics implied by Model I are reported in Table 4. Hours worked are
too volatile relative to output, whereas the relative volatility of investment and output is much too
low. Real wages are strongly countercyclical, and the correlation between hours and productivity
is strongly negative. Also, based on the likelihood ratio test (bottom of Table 1), the benchmark
model is strongly preferred by the data to Model I.
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Model II does not perform well either, being prone to the problems usually encountered in
standard (one-stage) RBC models. The relative volatility of hours and output is much too low.
The relative volatility of real wages to output is too high. Real wages and productivity are both
strongly procyclical. The correlation between hours and productivity is strongly positive. Based
on the likelihood ratio test, the benchmark model is strongly preferred by the data to Model II.
5 Conclusion
Real business cycle theory claims that technology shocks account for the bulk of short-run output
fluctuations. However, a recent strand of literature has questioned their importance for business
cycles (e.g., Gal´ı, 1999; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson, 2004; Basu, Fernald and Kimball,
2006). We have proposed in this paper a framework in which production chains play a key role in
the transmission of technological change. We have found that technology shocks cannot easily be
dismissed as a main source of the postwar business cycle. Our evidence also shows that nominal
rigidities make our framework successful in capturing the salient features of postwar business cycles.
Unlike one-stage models with nominal rigidities (e.g., Gal´ı, 1999), our two-stage framework
delivers rich predictions concerning the dynamics of employment during the business cycle. Our
evidence suggests that a technology improvement may either have a contractionary or expansionary
effect on employment depending on the source of technological change. The model identifies the
input-output linkage between firms operating at different stages of production and movements in
relative prices triggered by exogenous variations in the pace of technology as key factors determining
the response of hours worked to a technology shock. Despite the dominance of technology shocks,
the two-stage framework delivers a near-zero correlation between hours and productivity and mildly
procyclical real wages, two facts which have been hard to reconcile with technology-driven business
cycle models.
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Table 1: Parameter Estimation Results
Benchmak Model Model I Model II
Parameter Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
ρA,y 0.8716 0.0177 0.8573 0.0090 0.8524 0.0145
ρA,z 0.9600 0.0711 −−− −−− 0.9600 0.0014
ρv 0.1571 0.0335 0.6232 0.0366 0.3177 0.0302
ρκ 0.9512 0.0171 0.9108 0.0137 0.7188 0.0445
σA,y 0.0181 0.0007 0.0187 0.0010 0.0123 0.0008
σA,z 0.0197 0.0060 −−− −−− 0.0086 0.0003
σv 0.0232 0.0020 0.0059 0.0003 0.0079 0.0002
σκ 0.0133 0.0006 0.0101 0.0010 0.0052 0.0002
ρR 0.0918 0.0767 0.0000 −−− 0.0363 0.0597
ρpi 1.4702 0.0793 2.1285 0.0574 0.9984 0.0013
ρy −0.0050 0.0060 −0.0122 0.0039 −0.0153 0.0020
dw 0.8461 0.0079 0.9250 0.0313 −−− −−−
dy 0.6561 0.0256 0.7325 0.0063 −−− −−−
dz 0.6992 0.0539 −−− −−− −−− −−−
ϕk 9.5827 0.6927 11.1243 0.2791 7.4139 0.5207
ϕy 5.7406 1.8588 2.4015 0.2979 5.9127 0.8304
ϕz 3.3746 1.1554 −−− −−− 1.7069 0.5428
φ 0.2416 0.1312 −−− −−− 0.4954 0.0245
b 0.0744 0.0389 0.2521 0.0595 0.1792 0.0198
γ 0.0701 0.1537 0.2974 0.0450 0.1131 0.0215
αy 0.1300 0.0128 0.2564 0.0229 0.1333 0.0520
αz 0.3407 0.0461 −−− −−− 0.6110 0.0298
η 0.8831 0.4621 0.7120 0.3003 1.3040 0.0659
L = 3567.40 LI = 3506.73 LII = 3387.33
Benchmark Model: Two-stage model with nominal rigidities; Model I: One-stage model with nominal rigidities;
Model II: Two-stage model with flexible wages and prices
L denotes the maximized value of the log likelihood function. Then, the likelihood ratio statistic for the null hypothesis
that the benchmark model is preferred to model I is equal to 2(L − LI) that has a χ2(4) distribution which gives a
p− value = 0.9999.
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Table 2: Benchmark Model: Variance Decomposition (Infinite Horizon)
Variable εy,t εz,t εv,t εκ,t
Yt 5.12 72.38 14.76 7.74
Zt 3.86 84.22 11.46 0.46
Ct 4.83 67.03 14.54 13.60
It 5.46 80.69 13.35 0.50
Nt 19.64 44.91 21.87 13.57
Ny,t 19.48 37.36 22.94 20.23
Nz,t 10.39 76.19 11.54 1.88
wt 12.93 70.06 14.41 2.60
Yt
Nt
47.89 48.48 1.98 1.64
piy,t 14.67 10.25 71.58 3.50
piz,t 0.70 7.80 89.51 1.99
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Table 3: Benchmark Model: Variance Decomposition (Different Horizons)
Final-goods sector output (Yt)
Quarters ahead εy,t εz,t εv,t εκ,t
1 15.64 30.95 50.63 2.78
4 6.52 52.07 35.81 5.60
8 5.80 62.26 24.71 7.22
12 6.29 65.69 20.20 7.82
20 6.00 68.48 17.38 8.13
40 5.36 71.21 15.45 7.98
Intermediary-goods sector output (Zt)
Quarters ahead εy,t εz,t εv,t εκ,t
1 0.41 20.41 78.43 0.75
4 3.61 46.07 49.18 1.14
8 6.21 61.42 31.27 1.09
12 6.57 68.64 23.86 0.93
20 5.66 75.98 17.64 0.71
40 4.35 82.13 12.99 0.53
Final-goods sector inflation (piy,t)
Quarters ahead εy,t εz,t εv,t εκ,t
1 12.09 6.73 77.98 3.19
4 14.99 6.49 74.84 3.67
8 14.39 8.10 73.97 3.52
12 14.51 9.45 72.59 3.44
20 14.73 9.92 71.89 3.44
40 14.69 10.08 71.70 3.50
Intermediary-goods sector inflation (piz,t)
Quarters ahead εy,t εz,t εv,t εκ,t
1 0.11 2.25 95.71 1.94
4 0.62 4.49 92.83 2.06
8 0.67 6.67 90.65 2.01
12 0.67 7.43 89.90 1.99
20 0.68 7.54 89.79 1.99
40 0.70 7.68 89.63 1.99
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Table 4: Second-Order Unconditional Moments in the Benchmark and Alternative Models
Moments US data Benchmark Model Model I Model II
std(C)
std(Y ) 0.5062(0.0204)
0.8334 0.9104 0.7642
std(I)
std(Y ) 2.8681(0.0836)
2.6380 2.2057 2.1711
std(N)
std(Y ) 0.8543(0.0611)
0.9277 1.3100 0.2184
std(w)
std(Y ) 0.6372(0.0712)
0.7965 0.8293 1.0218
std(Y/N)
std(Y ) 0.5152(0.0815)
0.4965 0.6780 0.8115
std(N)
std(Y/N) 1.7615(0.0405)
1.8685 1.9320 0.2691
std(piy)
std(piz)
0.4753
(0.0646)
0.5540 −−− 0.9687
Corr(Y,C) 0.9105
(0.2345)
0.9909 0.9875 0.9615
Corr(Y, I) 0.9630
(0.2645)
0.9341 0.8378 0.9287
Corr(Y,N) 0.8192
(0.1860)
0.8700 0.8612 0.8909
Corr(Y, Y/N) 0.5188
(0.1856)
0.3886 −0.1891 0.9925
Corr(N,Y/N) −0.0535
(0.1033)
−0.1163 −0.6619 0.8287
Corr(Y,w) 0.3721
(0.1804)
0.2472 −0.6873 0.9710
Corr(Y/N,w) 0.6727
(0.1705)
0.8506 0.7519 0.9629
Corr(N,w) −0.0115
(0.1572)
−0.1888 −0.9138 0.8683
Corr(piy, piz) 0.7503
(0.2694)
0.8055 −−− 0.8848
32
Table 5: Second-Order Conditional Moments in the Benchmark Model
Moments US data Benchmark Model
All shocks εy εz Supply shocks Demand shocks
std(C)
std(Y ) 0.5062(0.0204)
0.8334 0.8090 0.8020 0.8025 0.9320
std(I)
std(Y ) 2.8681(0.0836)
2.6380 2.7228 2.7854 2.7813 2.0698
std(N)
std(Y ) 0.8543(0.0611)
0.9277 1.8165 0.7308 0.8467 1.1644
std(w)
std(Y ) 0.6372(0.0712)
0.7965 1.2652 0.7836 0.8242 0.6927
std(Y/N)
std(Y ) 0.5152(0.0815)
0.4965 1.5179 0.4064 0.5536 0.1993
std(N)
std(Y/N) 1.7615(0.0405)
1.8685 1.1967 1.7982 1.5295 5.8411
std(piy)
std(piz)
0.4753
(0.0646)
0.5540 2.5391 0.6351 0.9486 0.5019
Corr(Y,C) 0.9105
(0.2345)
0.9909 0.9951 0.9948 0.9948 0.9877
Corr(Y, I) 0.9630
(0.2645)
0.9341 0.9691 0.9691 0.9691 0.8057
Corr(Y,N) 0.8192
(0.1860)
0.8700 0.5493 0.9366 0.8329 0.9946
Corr(Y, Y/N) 0.5188
(0.1856)
0.3886 0.0015 0.7765 0.5325 −0.7931
Corr(N,Y/N) −0.0535
(0.1033)
−0.1163 −0.8348 0.5065 −0.0250 −0.8523
Corr(Y,w) 0.3721
(0.1804)
0.2472 −0.2865 0.6248 0.5257 −0.8916
Corr(Y/N,w) 0.6727
(0.1705)
0.8506 0.9208 0.9528 0.8771 0.8428
Corr(N,w) −0.0115
(0.1572)
−0.1888 −0.9272 0.3252 0.0473 −0.9099
Corr(piy, piz) 0.7503
(0.2694)
0.8055 0.4612 −0.0250 0.0861 0.9568
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to an Intermediate-Stage Technology Shock
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Final-Stage Technology Shock
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Figure 3: The Role of the Share of Intermediate Goods, φ
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Figure 4: The Role of Nominal Price Rigidities, dy and dz
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Figure 5: The Role of the Persistence of Final-Stage Technology Shocks, ρA,y
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